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The banker's right to setoff is the common law, equitable right of
a bank to apply the general deposits of a depositor against the matured
debts of the depositor. This right grows out of the contractual debtor-
creditor relationship created between the depositor and the bank at the
time the account is opened,' and it rests upon the principle that it
would be inequitable to permit the debtor-depositor to carry an open
account that induces the bank to extend credit, and then allow the
debtor to apply the funds to other purposes because he had not ex-
pressly agreed to apply them to the debt.2 In effect, the courts
recognize that a bank deposit establishes a debtor-creditor relationship
and the bank's setoff is a proper internal bookkeeping transaction of
the bank working with its own funds. The result is consistent with the
right to setoff as to mutual obligations-the cross-demands being
satisfied so far as they are equal-leaving whatever balance may be
due as the true amount of indebtedness of one party to the other.'
This right exists independent of statutory authority and may be exer-
cised without court supervision. Of course, the right may be extin-
guished or restricted by statute.'
Banker's Lien Distinguished
The bank's right to setoff is commonly called a "banker's lien,"
although strictly speaking it is not a lien when applied to general
© 1981 John TeSelle
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' Security State Bank v. Johnston & Co., 204 Okla. 160, 228 P.2d 169 (1951); Kasperek
v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 170 Okla. 207, 39 P.2d 127 (1934); Gillette v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 95
Okla. 76, 218 P. 1057 (1923).
1 Southwest Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 94 Okla. 185, 221 P. 53 (1923). Accord, Melson v.
Bank of New Mexico, 65 N.M. 70, 332 P.2d 472 (1958).
1 Ingram v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 533 P.2d 975 (Okla. 1975); Kasparek v.
Liberty Nat'l Bank, 170 Okla. 207, 39 P.2d 127 (1934). Accord, Sharpe v. Metropolitan Nat'l
Bank, 31 Colo. App. 511, 503 P.2d 1043 (1972); Ames Trust & Savings Bank v. Reichardt, 254
Iowa 272, 121 N.W.2d 200 (1963).
Gillette v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 95 Okla. 76, 218 P. 1057 (1923).
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deposits. Funds on general deposit in a bank are the property of the
bank for which the bank is a debtor, and the bank cannot have a lien
on its own property.'
This misnomer has created confusion in many jurisdictions that
have enacted statutory banker's lien laws. Oklahoma is a good exam-
ple. As provided by statute, "A banker has a general lien, dependent
on possession, upon all property in his hands belonging to a customer,
for the balance due to him from such customer in the course of busi-
ness."16 Oklahoma courts and parties to suits have frequently relied
upon this statute as authority for a bank to exercise its "banker's lien"
(meaning setoff) against general deposits of a debtor.' As shown
above, since a deposit of money in a general account becomes the prop-
erty of the bank, there is no property in the bank's hands belonging to
the customer on which the statute may operate. While the confusion is
not likely to disappear, Oklahoma courts have consistently reached
proper results despite the conflict in terms. Yet it is important to
recognize the distinction for two reasons. First, the enforcement of a
true lien on personal property of the customer in the bank's possession
may require compliance with statutory provisions or court supervision,
while setoff is a self-help remedy. Second, future limitation or repeal
of the statutory banker's lien should not necessarily affect the com-
mon law right to setoff unless such legislative intent is shown.9
I Ingram v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 533 P.2d 975 (Okla. 1975); Kasparek v.
Liberty Nat'l Bank, 170 Okla. 207, 39 P.2d 127 (1934).
6 42 OKLA. STAT. § 32 (1971).
E.g., Ingram v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 533 P.2d 975 (Okla. 1975); Security
State Bank v. Johnston & Co., 204 Okla. 160, 228 P.2d 169 (1951).
' Citizens Bank v. Beeson, 104 Okla. 293, 231 P. 844 (1925). See Kasparek v. Liberty
Nat'l Bank, 170 Okla. 207, 209, 39 P.2d 127, 129 (1935), where the court notes that banking
setoff exists apart from any statutory authority.
' Due Process and Setoff. The importance of the distinction between statutory lien and
common law setoff is illustrated by Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 31 Cal. App. 3d 202, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 133 (1973). Ms. Kruger had both a checking account and a Master Charge account with
the bank. When the Master Charge account became delinquent the bank notified her that funds
were being taken from her checking account under a "Banker's Lien" to meet the charge due.
Ms. Kruger sued, but the bank's demurrer was sustained. On appeal the court of appeals reversed,
holding the Banker's Lien Law to be unconstitutional. The bank argued that the funds were not
seized by virtue of the statute but rather through the common law right of setoff. The court held
that the issue of setoff had not been raised below and therefore was not properly before the
court. On appeal to the California Supreme Court the bank prevailed on the issue of setoff, only
to lose on other grounds. 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974), vacating 31
Cal. App. 3d 202, 107 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1973). The court found that setoff, not a lien, was involved
and that since setoff did not involve state action, it was not an unconstitutional denial of due
process. Ms. Kruger prevailed on the ground that her checking account deposits were derived
from unemployment and disability benefits, which are statutorily exempt in California. The
court held that funds which are exempt from attachment or execution are likewise exempt from
setoff.
Other cases have uniformly held that setoff does not constitute state action. Fletcher v.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol34/iss1/36
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Requirements for Setoff
The exercise of the right of setoff requires that certain prere-
quisites are met. First, the funds deposited must have been the prop-
erty of the debtor."0 Second, the funds must be deposited without
restriction and must not be a special fund." Third, there must be an
indebtedness then due and owing by the debtor to the bank." Finally,
and closely related to the third prerequisite, the deposit must have
created the relationship of debtor and creditor between the bank and
depositor, thereby creating mutuality of indebtedness between the
bank and depositor."
The remainder of this article will discuss the many problems
created by these prerequisites in various situations and identify and
discuss potential pitfalls for the unwary banker.
Requirement of Mutuality
The requirement of mutuality has several facets and is closely
related to the other requirements. Basically, mutuality of indebtedness
requires that the deposit give rise to the relationship of debtor and
creditor between the owner of the funds and the bank." Mutuality
further requires that the depositor be both a debtor and a creditor of
the bank. Therefore, a deposit in the name of "John Doe, Trustee"
may not be set off against a debt of John Doe, individual.
Similar problems arise if the deposit is a general account of the
depositor but the debt is a joint debt, or the debt of a partnership in
which the depositor is a partner, or if the depositor is merely a guaran-
tor of the! debt. Most of these issues will be discussed in detail later.
For now, the discussion will be limited to the general requirement that
the deposit create a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and
depositor.
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1974); Meyer v. Idaho First Nat'l
Bank, 96 Idaho 208, 525 P.2d 990 (1974); Nietzel v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 307
Minn. 147, 2.38 N.W.2d 437 (1976); Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 1284 (1975). See also Hibernia Nat'l
Bank v. Lee, 344 So. 2d 16 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
"I Southwest Nat'l Bank v. McVey, 94 Okla. 231, 221 P. 784 (1923) (again referring to
setoff as "banker's lien").
I Id.
12 Id.
1 Kasparek v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 170 Okla. 207, 39 P.2d 127 (1934). Accord, Sharpe v.
Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 31 Colo. App. 511, 503 P.2d 1043 (1972); Ames Trust & Savings Bank
v. Reichardt, 254 Iowa 272, 121 N.W.2d 200 (1963).
1" Security State Bank v. Johnston & Co., 204 Okla. 160, 228 P.2d 169 (1951). See also
Westerly Community Credit Union v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 103 R.I. 662, 240 A.2d 586 (1968).
[Vol. 34:40
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Debtor-Creditor Relationship
The debtor-creditor relationship between a bank and a depositor
is contractual and necessarily requires the consent, either express or
implied, of the depositor. Therefore, no third person can create this
relationship by depositing funds in the name of another without his
consent and without authority.' 5 A deposit by a third party often oc-
curs when parties of escrow agreements order the bank to deliver
funds to a certain party. 6 If that party has a past due debt with the
bank, the bank's natural tendency is to set off the funds in the escrow
account against the debt rather than to deliver the funds. The consis-
tent result of such attempts, when contested, has been that the parties
claiming these funds have prevailed over the bank. 7
While there are no cases on point, the necessary consent of the
depositor must be to the particular deposit in question and not to the
account in general. The fact that the debtor has a general account with
the bank apparently will not create a debtor-creditor relationship with
respect to funds deposited by a third party in thesaccount without the
debtor's knowledge, consent, or authority.' 8
Ownership of Funds Deposited
Perhaps the most perplexing requirement for the proper exercise
of a bank's right of setoff is that the debtor-depositor be the owner,
both legally and equitably, of the funds deposited. At first glance, the
requirement seems simple enough, but its effect is that funds deposited
by Debtor in Debtor's general account may not be subject to setoff for
some reason unknown to the bank.
Knowledge of Bank
The bank's lack of knowledge or notice of a third party's interest
in the funds is no defense in many jurisdictions,' 9 thus putting the
Security State Bank v. Johnston & Co., 204 Okla. 160, 163, 228 P.2d 169, 172 (1951).
6 E.g., Security State Bank v. Johnston & Co., 204 Okla. 160, 228 P.2d 169 (1951);
Gillette v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 95 Okla. 76, 218 P. 1057 (1923).
'7 Security State Bank v. Johnston & Co., 204 Okla. 160, 228 P.2d 169 (1951); Gillette v.
Liberty Nat'l Bank, 95 Okla. 76, 218 P. 1057 (1923).
11 Security State Bank v. Johnston & Co., 204 Okla. 160, 228 P.2d 169 (1951); Gillette v.
Liberty Nat'l Bank, 95 Okla. 76, 218 P. 1057 (1923).
19 See, e.g., Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 47 U.S. 212 (1848); Brady v.
American Nat'l Bank, 120 Okla. 159, 250 P. 1006 (1962); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 235, 249-51
(1966). It is arguable whether the United States Supreme Court would still follow this so-called
"equitable rule." In two cases following Bank of Metropolis the Court could have relied solely
on the strict equitable rule in holding that a bank could not set off an account in which a third
party had an interest. Instead, the cases turned on the bank's knowledge or notice of this in-
19811
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bank in a vulnerable, if not impossible, position. Actual knowledge or
notice on the bank's part that funds belonging to a third party have
been deposited in a debtor's account precludes setoff by the bank of
those funds.2" This rule is universal. 2' A corollary to this universal rule
is that the bank cannot exercise setoff if it has knowledge of cir-
cumstances sufficient to mandate inquiry into the ownership of funds
deposited in a debtor's account. While this rule enjoys wide accep-
tance, courts differ considerably as to the degree of knowledge of cir-
cumstances inconsistent with sole ownership by the depositor that will
necessitate inquiry by the bank.22 In a given case, the sufficiency of the
facts known by the bank to put it on inquiry notice can be determined
oniy by litigation. For the prudent banker who wishes to avoid litiga-
tion, almost any knowledge of special use or designation of the ac-
count 23 should indicate that careful consideration should be given to
any planned setoff, for example, words on checks deposited indicating
special use, interest of third parties, fiduciary nature of the depositor's
possession, 2 or the customary handling of funds of another.23
In the absence of actual knowledge or inquiry notice of a third
party's interest in deposited funds, the majority rule -is that a bank
may apply the deposit to the individual debt of the depositor. 6
However, a growing minority of jurisdictions,27 including Oklahoma,28
follow the "equitable" rule in such situations. This rule prohibits
terest. Union Stock Yards Nat'l Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U.S. 411 (1890); Central Nat'l Bank v.
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 54 (1881). Consequently the lower federal courts are
split on the relevancy of the bank's lack of knowledge or notice of a third party's interest in a
debtor-depositor's account. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 235, 249 n.16 (1966).
20 E.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Osage Supply Co., 186 Okla. 259, 97 P.2d 3
(1939); First Nat'l Bank v. W.P. Seawell Lumber Co., 135 Okla. 201, 274 P. 873 (1928).
22 Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 235, 239-42 (1966).
22 Compare First Nat'l Bank v. American Surety Co., 237 Ala. 35, 185 So. 365 (1938)
(where a deposit in the name of "W.E. McNair, Probate Judge" was sufficient to put the bank
on inquiry) and Sherts v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 342 Pa. 337, 21 A.2d 18 (1941) (where word "at-
torney" following depositor's name on account was sufficient) with Cunningham v. Bank of
Nampa, 13 Idaho 167, 88 P. 975 (1907) (where addition of "attorney" to depositor's name was
not sufficient) and Cooper v. Nevada Bank of Commerce, 81 Nev. 344, 403 P.2d 198 (1965)
(where bank's knowledge that funds were cash proceeds of crops from leased land was not suffi-
cient). See also Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 235, 255-60 (1966).
2, Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 235, 255-58 (1966).
14 Id. at 258-59.
2, Id. at 259-61. See also Brown v. Maguire's Real Estate Agency, 343 Mo. 336, 121
S.W.2d 754 (1938); First Nat'l Bank v. Duncan, 127 Okla. 226, 260 P. 491 (1927), overruled on
other grounds, sub. nom., Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Copeland, 138 Okla. 19, 280 P. 273 (1929).
26 Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 235, 246-48 (1966).
27 Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee Western Bank, 61 Wis. 2d 671, 214
N.W.2d 33 (1974).
2, Security State Bank v. Johnston & Co., 204 Okla. 160, 228 P.2d 169 (1951).
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setoff where a third party has an interest in funds deposited in the ac-
count of a debtor-depositor, even though the bank has no actual or
implied knowledge, where lack of such knowledge has not resulted in
any change in the bank's position and no superior equities have been
raised in the bank's favor.2 9 The change in position must be detrimen-
tal to the bank, and extinguishment of an antecedent debt of the
depositor is not such a change, as the return of the funds to the true
owner leaves the bank in the same position in relation to the deposi-
tor's indebtedness as when the funds were deposited. 30 Extension of




Another problem not solved by any of the above rules is the ex-
tent of the bank's right to set off an account standing in the names of
two or more persons against the individual debt of one of them. Clearly,
the bank knows that some of the funds may belong to the nondebtors,
but does this prevent setoff against the funds belonging to the debtor?
In a joint account any joint depositor may withdraw the entire account
at will. Should this permit the bank to set off the entire account
against any joint depositor's individual debt?
As to joint deposits, the majority rule is that the bank has a right
to set off against the individual debt of one joint depositor only so
much of the joint account as "belongs" to the debtor,32 or as some
courts state the rule, only to the extent of the debtor's "interest" in
the account.33 Apparently, the "interest" of which the court speaks is
not the general nature of a joint tenant's interest in joint property but
rather that portion of the funds which he owned individually prior to
their deposit in the joint account. 34 Evidence may also be presented to
show that a joint account was not intended by the depositor, or that
the account now belongs to the debtor alone despite its continued
designation as a joint account,35 or that it has been assigned.36
Only Colorado permits the bank to set off the entire joint ac-
29 Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 235, 249-55 (1966).
30 See, e.g., Berg v. Union State Bank, 179 Minn. 191, 229 N.W. 102 (1930); National
Indem. Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank, 162 Tex. 521, 348 S.W.2d 528 (1961); Cassidy
Comm'n Co. v. Security State Bank, 333 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); First Nat'l Bank v.
First State Bank, 252 S.W. 1089 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
11 Brady v. American Nat'l Bank, 120 Okla. 159, 250 P. 1006 (1926).
32 Annot., 68 A.L.R.3d 192 (1976).
11 Guilds v. Monroe County Bank, 41 Mich. App. 616, 200 N.W.2d 769 (1972).
14 See generally Annot., 68 A.L.R.3d 192, 198-200 (1976).
" Id.




count against the private debt of any joint depositor,37 having done
SO. 38 On the other hand, Maryland does not permit the debt of one of
several joint account owners to be charged against any portion of the
joint account.3 9
Partnership Accounts
As to partnership accounts, the general rule is that the debt of
one partner may not be set off against the partnership account.' 0 The
bank does not possess the right to set off even the amount of the part-
nership account equivalent to the debtor-partner's alleged interest in
the partnership against the individual partner's debt. 4
Special Purpose Accounts
A prerequisite to a bank's right of setoff that often overlaps the
requirement that the debtor-depositor be the owner of the funds is that
the account be on general deposit, i.e., the deposit must not be a
special purpose account. For example, funds deposited by a trustee in
a "Trust Account" may not be-set off against a private debt of the
trustee for two reasons: (1) the bank has notice of third parties' in-
terests in the account, and (2) the deposit is a special purpose account
and not a general account of the trustee in his individual capacity.
A special purpose account is generally one over which the deposi-
tor has only limited dominion and control. The deposit is usually made
with special restrictions or limitations agreed upon between the bank
and depositor. Accounts specially designated for the depositor's ac-
counting purposes, such as a separate "Payroll Account," or deposits
the depositor plans to use for a special purpose will not be considered
special accounts for the purposes of setoff, even if the bank knows of
the intended special use, 2 if the depositor retains unlimited dominion
over the account.' 3
If the account is indeed a special purpose account or deposit, the
bank must have notice of the special nature of the deposit before its
right to setoff is restricted." Normally, the special deposit will result
" COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-6-105 (1973).
" Burgess v. First Nat'l Bank, 31 Colo. App. 67, 497 P.2d 1035 (1972).
" Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972).
Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 295, 301 (1955). See Kleinschmidt v. White, 159 Okla. 234, 15
P.2d 127 (1932).
4' First State Bank v. Vestal & Naugle, 48 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
42 United States v. Tri-County Bank, 415 F. Supp. 858 (D.S.D. 1976).
41 In re Goodson Steel Corp., 488 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1974); Ribaudo v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 261 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Tri-County Bank, 415 F. Supp. 858 (D.S.D.
1976).
" Griffin-Townsend Co. v. First State Bank, 191 Okla. 460, 130 P.2d 540 (1942).
[Vol. 34:40
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from an agreement between the depositor and the bank, which would
of itself provide notice to the bank. However, if the funds are deposi-
ted for the specific purpose of, for example, payment of particular
outstanding checks, the bank must have notice of this purpose if setoff
is to be prohibited.4"
Common examples of special accounts include funds held in es-
crow by the bank," funds deposited for the payment of certain debts
or classes of debts 4 7 and funds pledged as security for specific debts.48
In all such cases the bank has agreed to the special instructions or
restrictions required by the deposit.
The importance of the bank's agreement to the special designa-
tion of the funds can be illustrated by reference to the earlier example
of a deposit designated by the depositor as "Payroll Account." The
special designation alone does not create a special account. Since the
depositor can withdraw the funds at will for any purpose, the funds
are subject to creditor's claims, including the bank's right to setoff,
just as any general account of the depositor. However, if the bank
agrees to hold the funds and to honor only certain checks payable to
depositor's employees, the account becomes a special one that is no
longer subject to the depositor's unlimited discretion or to the bank's
right to setoff.4 9 The basic difference between the two situations is that
without the agreement the deposit created the normal debtor-creditor
relationship"0 between the bank and depositor, while with the agree-
ment the relationship as to the deposit becomes one of trust.
Also noteworthy in a discussion of special accounts is the case of
Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Loble.5' In that case a faltering business
depositor, Loble, discussed discontinuing the business with the presi-
dent of Union. At that time the business was indebted to the bank on
an unsecured note and was overdrawn on its general account with
,' Id. at 542, citing First Nat'l Bank v. Barger, 115 S.W. 726 (Ky. 1909).
4 E.g., First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Osage Supply Co., 186 Okla. 259, 97 P.2d 3
(1939).
4, E.g., In re Davis, 119 F. 950 (W.D. Tex. 1903); Wilson v. Dawson, 52 Ind. 513
(1876); City Nat'l Bank v. Brink, 98 Ind. App. 275, 187 N.E. 689 (1933); Smith v. Sanborn State
Bank, 147 Iowa 640, 126 N.W. 779 (1910); Straus v. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 122 N.Y. 379, 25
N.E. 372 (1890); Wagner v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 122 Tenn. 164, 122 S.W. 245 (1909).
4 E.g., Engleman v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 98 Cal. App. 2d
327, 219 P.2d 868 (1950).
" In re Goodson Steel Corp., 488 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1974).
10 Id. The court noted that in the absence of a specific agreement by which the bank
assumes the position of trustee, the presumption is that the deposit creates the relationship of
debtor and creditor. See also Griffin-Townsend Co. v. First State Bank, 191 Okla. 460, 130 P.2d
540 (1942). The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. In re Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 725
(5th Cir. 1980).
11 20 F.2d 124 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 545 (1927).
19811
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Union. Union's president suggested that a special sale be conducted in
order to pay certain creditors, after which the business could be
reorganized and continued. The proceeds of the sale were deposited in
the general account of the depositor without restrictions placed
thereon by the bank. Creditors were informed that Union and other
lenders were willing to extend their loans and were requested to allow
an extension also. When it became apparent that the plan of reorgani-
zation had failed, Union set off the remaining funds in the account.
In a subsequent contest over the funds between the bank and the
depositor's trustee in bankruptcy, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a ruling
by the district court that the funds were not subject to the bank's right
of setoff on the ground that the deposits were special deposits creating
a trust fund. The court recognized that while the deposit was subject
to the depositor's unlimited discretion and therefore not within the ac-
cepted definition of a special deposit, the role of the bank in creating
the fund was sufficient to so far impress upon it the character of a
trust fund that the bank should be estopped to assert its right to
setoff.
2
While the possible far-reaching implications of Loble have ap-
parently been limited by a subsequent Second Circuit decision, 3 it is
still possible for a bank, in a good faith attempt to refinance or other-
wise assist a struggling depositor, to create special accounts out of
general deposits and thereby lose its right to setoff if the customer's
business ultimately fails."'
Matured Debt
The general rule is that a bank may not set off a deposit against
an unmatured debt of a depositor absent an agreement to that effect
between the bank and the depositor.15 A debt is mature on or after the
date when payment may be required. The rule applies only to debts
that the depositor is absolutely and unconditionally bound to pay. 6
'While a discharge in bankruptcy is neither payment nor extinguish-
52 Id. at 126.
" (In re Allied Logic Corp.) New Jersey Nat'l Bank v. Gutterman, 576 F.2d 952 (2d
Cir. 1978). The Loble decision would serve as better precedent if the court had emphasized or
relied solely on the grounds that the proceeds from the special sale were not deposited in the nor-
rnal course of business and, therefore, were not subject to setoff against the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. See the enlightened dissent of Justice Pope in First Nat'l Bank v. Dudley, 231 F.2d 396,
(03 (9th Cir. 1956), which recognizes the distinction, while the majority were misled by the Loble
decision.
" See, e.g., Twentieth Street Bank v. Gilmore, 71 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1934); Union Trust
Co. v. Peck, 16 F.2d 986 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 767 (1927).
1 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 298 (1938).
16 Ingram v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 533 P.2d 975, 977 (Okla. 1975).
[Vol. 34:40
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ment of a debt, it does divest the debt of its character as a legally en-
forceable obligation. Therefore, a debt that has been discharged in
bankruptcy may not form the basis for setoff of a bankrupt's account
that was created by deposits made after the discharge.5
Demand notes are due at once,58 as are debts created by the sub-
sequent dishonor of checks drawn by third parties belonging to and
deposited by a depositor to his credit.59 Neither partial payment of a
demand or matured obligation nor a promise to pay the amount due at
some future time constitutes sufficient consideration for refraining
from immediate collection of the debt.6
Insolvent Debtor
The courts are split as to the bank's right to setoff against un-
matured debts of an insolvent debtor. Oklahoma follows the majority
rule that upon insolvency of a depositor, a bank may set off his
deposits against his unmatured notes. 6' The Federal Bankruptcy Act,62
which, of course, preempts any contradictory rule in any applicable
case, follows the majority rule.
The rule allowing setoff upon insolvency requires more than the
bank's belief that the debtor might be insolvent. There must be an in-
voluntary adjudication of bankruptcy, a voluntary filing for bankrupt-
cy, a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, or some other
proof of insolvency before unmatured debts may be set off.63 In a con-
test over the deposit, the bank must prove that the debtor was insol-
vent when the setoff was made. 64 In addition, setoff may not be avail-
able upon grounds of insolvency where the loan sought to be set off
was made while the debtor was insolvent but before any adjudication
of insolvency, at least where such condition should have been known
by the bank through the observance of sound banking practices.
65
57 Id.
11 E.g., Kenyon v. Youngman, 40 F.2d 813 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 854
(1930); Sturdivant v. McCorley, 83 Ark. 278, 103 S.W. 732 (1907); Continental Oil Co. v.
Horsey, 177 Md. 383, 9 A.2d 607 (1939); Citizens' Sav. Bank v. Vaughan, 115 Mich. 156, 73
N.W. 143 (1897).
'9 Krinsky v. Pilgrim Trust Co., 337 Mass. 401, 149 N.E.2d 665 (1958).
60 Paine-Eric Hosp. Supply, Inc. v. Lincoln First Bank, 82 Misc. 2d 432, 370 N.Y.S.2d
370 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
61 Parker v. First Nat'l Bank, 96 Okla. 70, 220 P. 39 (1923). The minority rule is that a
bank may not set off against unmatured debts of an insolvent depositor. E.g., Bosler's Adm'rs
v. Exchange Bank, 4 Pa. 32 (1846).
62 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1976).
63 Friedman v. First Nat'l Bank, 344 Mass. 593, 183 N.E.2d 722 (1962); Rogosin v. City
Trust Co., 107 N.J. Eq. 79, 151 A. 834 (1930).
6 Meinhart v. Farmers' State Bank, 124 Kan. 333, 259 P. 698 (1927); Thomas v. Nat'l
Bank, 16 N.J. Misc. 271, 198 A. 539 (1939).
65 Waiter v. National City Bank, 42 Ohio St. 2d 524, 330 N.E.2d 425 (1975).
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Deceased Debtor
As a general rule, a bank has the same rights regarding setoff
against a deceased depositor's estate as it had against the depositor
during his lifetime. If the estate is solvent, the bank may not set off
deposits against debts unmatured at the time of death absent an ex-
press agreement authorizing setoff. 66 The bank may set off debts as
they mature after death, but such setoff may be limited to the amount
deposited by the decedent and excluding amounts subsequently deposi-
ted by his executor or administrator. 67 Where the estate is insolvent,
the weight of authority is that the bank may set off deposits against
unmatured debts of the decedent.68
An otherwise unmatured debt may be subject to setoff if it was
procured by fraud or mistake on the part of the debtor, for example,
by misrepresenting his financial condition when applying for a loan.6 9
The theory is that the debt became due when created because it was
obtained through fraud or false statements. 0
Well-drafted loan and security agreements can be of great benefit
in eliminating many of these potential problems. Such clauses can give
the bank the right to accelerate 7' and set off unmatured debts upon the
death of the borrower or, if in good faith, the bank can also set off if
it has reason to believe it is undersecured or that the borrower may be
insolvent.
What Debts May Be Set Off
As a rule, any indebtedness of a depositor to the bank may form
the basis for setoff if such indebtedness is certain, definite, and liqui-
66 Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 908, 912 (1966). But see Kasparek v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 170
Okla. 207, 39 P.2d 127 (1934), where the court in dictum states that unmatured debts of a
deceased may be set off regardless of the solvency or insolvency of the estate. If such is the rule,
Oklahoma would be in a clear minority. If the estate is solvent, there is no equity in the bank's
favor because it will eventually receive payment. In such a case, there is no reason to permit the
bank to alter its agreement and collect the debt before it is due.
67 Kasparek v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 170 Okla. 207, 39 P.2d 127 (1934). There is con-
siderable differ.ece of opinion among jurisdictions as to this rule, however. See Annot., 7
A.L.R.3d 908, 920 (1966).
63 Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 908, 913 (1966). There is a large minority that does not permit
setoff. Oklahoma is apparently among the majority. Kasparek v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 170 Okla.
207, 39 P.2d 127 (1934).
19 Paoli v. East River Nat'l Bank, 92 Misc. 153, 155 N.Y.S. 245 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Annot.,
7 A.L.R.3d 908, 917-18 (1966).
,0 Paoli v. East River Nat'l Bank, 92 Misc. 153, 155 N.Y.S. 245 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
"1 The act of setoff itself was sufficient affirmative action for the proper exercise of the
bank's option to declare payments due under an acceleration clause that permitted the bank to
accelerate anytime it deemed itself insecure in Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1975).
The debts are therefore due at the time of setoff, eliminating one potential ground for defeating
the bank's collection of the accelerated debt.
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dated, or capable of liquidation by calculation." If the depositor owes
more than one debt, the bank may set off his deposits against any
matured debt it chooses." The general rule is not without qualifica-
tion, however, and there are several situations that deserve additional
consideration.
Secured Debts
Considerable controversy exists concerning the availability of
setoff against matured debts secured by other collateral. The majority
rule followed in Oklahoma appears to be that a bank may set off a
debtor's account against matured notes fully secured by collateral
without first exhausting its remedy as to the collateral. 74 The rule is
founded upon the rationale that a creditor should be permitted to pur-
sue any available remedy until the debt is collected.7 The fact that a
creditor has the foresight to demand collateral for a debt should not
deprive him of the remedy of setoff.
76
The minority rule does not permit setoff until the collateral is ex-
hausted.77 This rule is based upon the rule or statute that there is but
one action for the recovery of a debt that is secured by collateral.7 8
Setoff is permitted against any deficiency even under the minority rule,
unless such right is limited or barred by statute.7 9
Impact of Federal Regulation
Federal regulation of consumer lending has had a significant im-
12 5A MicIE, BANKs AND BANKING § 119 (1950).
73 Id.
7' Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Crow Creek
Sioux Tribe v. Tri-County Bank, 415 F. Supp. 858 (D.S.D. 1976). But see MICHIE, supra note 72
at section 119c, which implies that the majority rule is to the contrary. In Oklahoma, a holder of
a note secured by a mortgage is not required to foreclose the mortgage before bringing action on
the note. Anderson v. Warren, 196 Okla. 251, 164 P.2d 221 (1945).
,1 Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1975); UCC § 9-501(1) (1972 version).
76 Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1975).
7 Id.
11 Id. The rule apparently began in California in McKean v. German-American Sav.
Bank, 118 Cal. 334, 50 P. 656 (1897), where the court held that CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 726
(Cum. Supp. 1979), which requires that a holder of a note secured by a mortgage must first ex-
haust his security and obtain a deficiency judgment before any further action may be taken
against the debtor, prohibits setoff until such requirements are satisfied. Utah adopted a similar
statute along with California's construction. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-1 (1953) (amended by
Laws of Utah 1965, ch. 172 § 1 to delete debts secured by chattel morgages). Arguably, the
minority rule in Utah now applies only to debts secured by mortgages on real property.
Massachusetts and New Mexico adopted the California rule even though they have no similar
statutes. Forastiere v. Springfield Inst. for Say., 303 Mass. 101, 20 N.E.2d 950 (1939); Pruden-
tial Realty Co. v. Allen, 241 Mass. 277, 135 N.E. 221 (1922); Furber v. Dane, 203 Mass. 108, 89
N.E. 227 (1909); Melson v. Bank of New Mexico, 65 N.M. 70, 332 P.2d 472 (1958).
11 Woodruff v. California Republic Bank, 75 Cal. App. 3d 108, 141 Cal. Rptr. 915,
(1977).
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pact on a bank's right to setoff. To date, courts have held that the
right of setoff is not a "security interest" requiring disclosure to bor-
rowers under the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act.80 Nevertheless, many
bankers are including setoff in their disclosure statements."2
The Fair Credit Billing Act" prohibits the setting off of a debt
arising from the use of a bank credit card in a consumer credit transac-
tion. The credit card plan may permit the issuing bank periodically to
deduct partial or complete payment of credit card debts from the card-
holder's account if the cardholder so authorizes in writing.8 3 More-
over, nothing in the regulations alters or affects the bank's rights to
remedies under state law to attack or levy upon a debtor's deposit ac-
count.84
Joint Debts
Case law is surprisingly scarce as to the right of a bank to set off
the account of a depositor against the joint debt of the depositor and
others. Ordinarily, equity will not permit the setoff of a separate debt
against a joint debt. 5 This rule speaks to setoff of mutual demands in
general, however, and does not specifically refer to bank setoff.
Apparently only Indiana has affirmatively held that a bank may
not set off the deposit of an individual against the joint and several
obligation of that individual and others unless the individual is the
lone principal and the others are sureties.8 6 Arkansas, 7 Illinois,8 8 and
Texas 9 have held that a bank may set off an individual deposit of one
of several debtors against the joint debt. A New York trial court
recently ruled that a bank properly set off a savings account of a
depositor against an overdraft in a joint checking account of the
depositor and her husband.90 It does not appear, however, that the
issue was well presented in the case.
" 15 U.S.C. § 1666h (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.7(a) (7) (1978); Fletcher v. Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1001 (1974); Mullen v.
North Pac. Bank, 25 Wash. App. 846, 610 P.2d 949 (1980). See Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-
States Dev. Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
" J. CLARK, BANK DEPosrTs, COLLECTIONS, AND CREDIT CARDS 276 (Cum. Supp. No. 2
1978).
.2 15 U.S.C. § 1666(h) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 226.130) (1978).
3 12 C.F.R. § 226.130) (1978).
84 Id. at n.16.
" 57 C.J. Set-Off and Counterclaim § 117 (1932).
86 Teeters v. City Nat'l Bank, 214 Ind. 498, 14 N.E.2d 1004 (1938); Lamb v. Morris, 118
Ind. 179, 20 N.E. 746 (1889).
:7 Rush v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 114 Ark. 170, 169 S.W. 777 (1914).
8 Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Maple, 65 I11. App. 484 (1895).
89 Sears v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 553 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on
other grounds, 562 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1977).
90 Miles v. Bank of Commerce, 76 Misc. 2d 623, 351 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Civ. Ct. of N.Y.,
Queens Co. 1973).
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The better rule would appear to be that if the bank could proceed
directly against the depositor alone in a suit on the debt, or could ob-
tain satisfaction of a judgment against the joint debtors from the
depositor alone, then the bank should be permitted the self-help
remedy of setoff. 91 Such a rule should in no way affect the right of
contribution or indemnity or any other relationship among the joint
debtors.
Debts Evidenced by Negotiable Instruments
As to partnership debts, the general rule is that a bank may not
apply the individual account of a partner against a partnership debt. 92
Mississippi" and Kentucky94 have recognized an opposite rule based
upon the joint and several nature of partnership liabilities under state
law at the time the issue was presented. Oklahoma courts have not yet
addressed this issue but are most likely to follow the majority rule
because of the nature of partnership liabilities in Oklahoma.
Under the Uniform Partnership Act as adopted in Oklahoma, 95
partners are only jointly, not severally, liable for most partnership
debts that would normally arise in a bank's favor. 96 Generally, the
liability of a partner for a partnership debt must be established by
judgment against the partnership, and the partner's individual liability
accrues only after partnership assets are depleted. 97 It would be incon-
sistent with this general rule of law to permit setoff of an individual
partner's account against a firm debt. 98
"1 See Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Maple, 65 Ill. App. 484 (1896); Hayden v. Alton Nail
Bank, 29 Ill. App. 458 (1888). For example, in Oklahoma as in most states, joint makers, accep-
tors, drawers, or endorsers of commercial instruments are jointly and severally liable on the in-
strument unless otherwise specified. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-118 (1971). There is no readily ap-
parent reason for prohibiting setoff of such joint party's personal account when the joint obliga-
tion becomes past due, since the bank could proceed against such person severally without pre-
judice to its rights as holder against the other joint parties. Schneider v. Republic Supply Co.,
123 Okla. 98, 252 P. 45 (1926).
92 Manhattan Bank v. Walker, 130 U.S. 267 (1888); 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 302
(1938). However, a loan made to one partner, solely on his credit, is the personal debt of the
partner even though he uses the money to benefit the partnership, and the personal account of
the partner should be subject to setoff upon maturity of the loan. See Helmerich & Payne v.
American Nat'l Bank, 195 Okla. 318, 157 P.2d 168 (1945).
11 Eyrich v. Capital State Bank, 67 Miss. 60, 6 So. 615 (1889). See also 54 OKLA. STAT. §
215 (1971).
1, Owsley v. Bank of Cumberland, 23 Ky. L. Reptr. 1726, 66 S.W. 33 (1902). But see 54
OKLA. STAT. § 215 (1971).
, 54 OKLA. STAT. §§ 201-244 (1971).
96 54 OKLA. STAT. § 215 (1971).
7 In re Fowler, 407 F. Supp. 799 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Carter v. Love, 394 P.2d 472
(Okla. 1964); McInnish v. Continental Oil Co., 362 P.2d 969 (Okla. 1961); Lenz v. Young, 307
P.2d 844 (Okla. 1957); Southard v. Oil Equip. Corp., 296 P.2d 780 (Okla. 1956); Fowler v.
Brooks, 193 Okla. 580, 146 P.2d 304 (1944).
11 Kentucky has now adopted the Uniform Partnership Act making partners' liability
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A potential conflict between the rule for joint debts and the rule
for partnership debts can be foreseen. For example, in Oklahoma the
liability of comakers of a joint note is joint and several, 99 thus
arguably permitting setoff of one maker's personal account against the
joint debt. On the other hand, partners are only jointly liable on a
partnership's note.10 What if A and B cosign a joint note and the
bank later applies the checking account of A to the note when it
becomes delinquent? A sues for conversion and wrongful dishonor of
subsequent checks and proves to the court that A and B were in fact
partners in the venture for which the loan was obtained, and there-
fore, that setoff of his personal account was improper. If the court
should find for A, the liability of the bank could be enormous."'
Clearly, in such a situation, the note should be treated as a joint
debt and not as a partnership debt unless the bank had actual notice of
the existence of the partnership at the time the note was executed., 0 2 It
would not be enough to prohibit setoff if the bank received notice of
the partnership before setoff, for this would permit the makers to
benefit from the law by concealing or omitting a material fact when
the note is executed. If the bank knew of the existence of the partner-
ship, it could provide for joint and several liability in the instrument.
If the existence of the partnership is not known to the bank when the
note is executed, the bank should be permitted to continue to rely
upon the statute as to joint makers'03 according to the facts known
when the note was executed.
An accommodation party to a note is liable in the capacity in
which he signs.' ' Thus, if a party signs as an accommodation maker,
he is jointly and severally liable as a comaker even if the bank knows
of his accommodation status,' 0 5 and setoff should be available against
his individual account as against the account of any maker of a note.
joint only for most debts. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 362.150, 362.220 (Baldwin Supp. 1978).
Therefore, it is likely that Owsley v. Bank of Cumberland, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1726, 6 So. 615
(1902) would now be overruled.
Mississippi also adopted the Uniform Act but modified the section on partners' liability
to provide that all partners are jointly and severally liable on all debts of the partnership. Miss.
CODE ANN. § 79-12-29 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Therefore, there is reason for continuing to recognize
the minority rule in Mississippi.
11 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-118(e) (1971).
,00 54 OKLA. STAT. § 215 (1971).
0I E.g., Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966); Security
State Bank v. Johnston & Co., 204 Okla. 160, 228 P.2d 169 (1951).
2 Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Maple, 65 Ill. App. 484 (1896).
101 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-118 (1971).
104 Id. § 3-415.
,o Id. § 3-415(2).
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If the bank knows of the accommodation status, it would be prudent
for the bank first to apply any property or accounts of the primary
maker against the note before applying those of the accommodation
maker.' 0 1 The bank should be aware, however, that an accommoda-
tion party possesses certain defenses not ordinarily available to makers
and indorsers' 07 which may discharge him and therefore prohibit set-
off.
Although authority is scarce, setoff against the deposits of an in-
dorser of an instrument would seem permissible after the necessary
steps (normally notice of dishonor or default)'"8 have been taken to
give rise to the indorser's liability.0 9 Likewise, setoff against a guaran-
tor would be permissible as soon as the instrument upon which pay-
ment is guaranteed is past due." 10 In the case of guaranteed payment, it
is unnecessary first to make demand upon the maker or drawee, or to
give notice to the guarantor.I' If the guarantor only guarantees collec-
tion, he becomes liable only after the bank reduces its claim against
the maker or acceptor to judgment and execution has been returned
unsatisfied, or after the maker or acceptor has become insolvent or the
bank can show that it is otherwise useless to proceed against them." '
Therefore, these steps must be taken before setoff against a guarantor
of collection would be permissible.
Priority of Setoff
Setoff and the UCC
The following discussion will concern the bank's right of setoff
versus claims of third parties to the debtor's deposits arising under or
controlled by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 3 While it can
be stated as a general proposition that the UCC does not control the
right of a bank to assert setoff," 4 the UCC does control banking
transactions in general and may therefore affect the right to setoff in
many instances, especially where the rights of third party claimants are
1C6 See Maryland Cas. Co. v. National Bank, 320 Pa. 129, 182 A. 362 (1936).
10, E.g., 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-606 (1971); Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Marshall, 551 P.2d 315
(Okla. App. 1976).
OI Citizens Nat'l Bank v. John Wills, Inc., 130 N.J.L. 201, 31 A.2d 820 (1943).
,09 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-414(1) (1971); § 3-416(1); Munday v. Bank of Franklin, 211 N.C.
276, 189 S.E. 779 (1937).
11 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-414(1) (1971).
I 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-416(5) (1971).
... Id. § 3-416(2).
"I E.g., 12A OKLA. STAT. (1971).
114 First Nat'l Bank v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 529 S.W.2d 67 (rex. 1975) (per curiamn).
See also Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. App. 1978).
1981]
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involved. ]Before some of these situations are examined in detail, some
generally applicable preliminary discussion is appropriate.
Section 9-104(i), 11S which excludes setoff from the application of
Article 9, was intended for the narrow purpose of excluding setoff as
an Article 9 security interest. 1 6 Therefore, a bank need not comply
with Article 9 in asserting setoff, but section 9-104(i) does not totally
remove commercial transactions or conflicts involving setoff from the
operation of the UCC." 1
7
Setoff is clearly subject to the limitations of section 4-303,'1 8
which controls the time at which setoff comes too late to defeat the
bank's duty to pay an item chargeable to the debtor's deposit.
Section 3-122(l)," which establishes when a cause of action ac-
crues against an instrument, has been held to control when setoff may
be exercised against a debt on a time instrument.' 21 Since a bank can-
not initiate suit on a time instrument until the day after the note
matures, setoff cannot be exercised until the day following the date of
maturity.
In a discussion of conflicts with claims of other parties, it is im-
portant to note that setoff is not self-executing.' 2 ' The mere decision
by bank officials to set off a depositor's account and the transmission
of that decision to the necessary employees within the bank is not suf-
ficient to effect setoff. There must be some direct, positive, and final
performance evidencing the setoff before setoff will be deemed to have
been exercised in a contest with another claimant.' 22 The Sixth Circuit
recently held that there are three steps necessary to complete setoffI23 :
(1) a decision by bank officials to set off the depositor's account, (2)
some action that accomplishes setoff, and (3) some record that
's 12A OKLA. SrAT. § 9-104(i) (1971).
12 Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Borstein, 374 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1979); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-
States Dev. Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. App. 1978); Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity Union
Trust Co., 111 N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d 330 (1970). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Iowa Beef
Processors, 626 F.2d 764 (10th Cir" 1980).
27 Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. App. 1978).
12A OKLA. STAT. § 4-303 (1971).
Id. § 3-122(1).
20 Marine Midland Bank v. Graybar Elec. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 703, 363 N.E.2d 1139, 395
N.Y.S.2d 403 (1977).
121 United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); Baker v. Nat'l City Bank, 387 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ohio 1974),
aff'd, 511 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1975); Aspen Indus., Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 74 A.D.2d 59,
426 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1980). See also Citizens & Peoples Nat'l Bank v. United States, 570 F.2d 1279
(5th Cir. 1978).
122 United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977).
"' Baker v. National City Bank, 511 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1975).
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evidences the completed setoff, such as bookkeeping entries or some
similarly binding overt act.
Setoff Versus Stop Order
Frequently an account of a depositor that is set off by the bank
will have items drawn by third parties credited to it, although the items
are still in the collection process. The rights of the bank versus the
third party drawer who stops payment on such an instrument require
discussion.
This situation is not at all unlikely. The scenario goes something
like this. The decision is made to set off the deposits of a struggling
debtor against his overdue debts. The bank waits until the debtor
makes his daily or weekly deposit in his account, then exercises setoff.
Issuers of checks recently deposited by the debtor, but still in the col-
lection process, get word of the bank's act, often by a phone call from
the debtor, and place stop payment orders on the checks.' 24 Can the
bank enforce the check against the issuer? The answer, of course, is
maybe.
Presuming the check is properly indorsed and delivered, the bank
is the holder of the check and may enforce it in its own right,'
2
1
although the bank may also hold the check as agent of the depositor
for collection. But if the drawer of the instrument has a personal
defense he can raise, the bank must be a holder in due course in order
to prevail over the stop order.'2 6 Often the depositor is in a convenient
position to provide a defense for the drawer, such as repudiation of
the contract or nondelivery of goods.
Holder in due course status requires the bank to have given value
for the instrument, 7 and this requirement will likely create the hitch
in the bank's case. Recent cases indicate that a bank will not be deemed
to have given value for an instrument merely by applying the provi-
sional credit given to the depositor against an antecedent debt of the
depositor.' s2 The court's reasoning behind the rule is that since the
credit given against the debt is provisional, and when the instrument is
dishonored, the portion of the debt set off against the credit is rein-
2' E.g., Marine Midland Bank v. Graybar Elec. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 703, 363 N.E.2d 1139,
395 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1977).
2I 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-301 (1971).
,26 Id. § 3-305.
.2, Id. § 3-302(1)(a).
"I Marine Midland Bank v. Graybar Elec. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 703, 363 N.E.2d 1139, 395
N.Y.S.2d 403 (1977) is the only recent decision directly on point. See Wilson Supply Co. v. West
Artesia Trans. Co., 505 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd, 511 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1974) (same
result where payment of debt was through bilateral agreement instead of unilateral setoff).
1981]
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stated. The bank has actually parted with nothing, i.e., has given no
value. 2 9 This reasoning is not overpowering, however, and many
cases, while not directly contradictory, certainly conflict with the
underlying rationale and question the propriety of such a rule. 3 '
It is not questioned that the bank's mere granting of a provisional
credit in its capacity as collecting bank is not a giving of value unless
the credit is drawn upon or is available for withdrawal as a matter of
right.' In the case of setoff, however, the bank is not claiming in its
status of collecting bank under Article 4,132 but as a holder under Arti-
cle 3. Section 3-303(b) provides: "A holder takes the instrument for
value . . . when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security
for an antecedent claim against any person. . . .,'" The courts have
responded to this claim of the bank by saying that since the credit
given was provisional and subject to revocation, the payment of the
debt was conditional, and therefore the provisions of section 3-303(b)
are not applicable.1' But, except for bank paper, isn't the analogous
situation true for any transferee who takes an instrument in satisfac-
tion of an antecedent debt? Consider, for example, the case of Coven-
try Care, Inc. v. United States, '  in which the government was
assigned a promissory note in payment of or as security for antedecent
tax claims. In a contest over the note, the government was held to be a
holder in due course under section 3-303(b) because it had given value
for the note by taking it in payment of or as security for an antecedent
debt. Yet, was the underlying tax claim discharged? Of course not. At
" Marine Midland Bank v. Graybar Elec. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 703, 712, 363 N.E.2d 1139,
1145, 395 N.Y.S.2d 403, 409 (1977).
130 Citizens Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 334 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1964) comes
closest to a directly opposite holding. Here the item was a cashier's check (bank paper),
therefore the underlying debt was discharged. UCC § 3-802(1). This technically distinguishes the
case from the situation where the item is not bank paper and the debt is not discharged.
However, the court recognized that the depository bank gave only a provisional settlement when
it accepted the check and that the bank had recourse against the depositor if the check was un-
collectible. The court held the depository bank had still given value despite the provisional
nature of the credit. See also Bowling Green, Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 307 F. Supp.
648, 655 (D. Mass. 1969) (dictum), where the court interprets the UCC as providing that value is
given when a depository bank exercises a right of setoff, citing UCC § 4-208, Comment 1, aff'd,
425 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1970).
"I 12A OKLA. STAT. §§ 4-208, 4-209 (1971). See also Friendly Nat'l Bank v. Farmers Ins.
Group, 52 OKLA. B.J. 1386 (June 13, 1981).
" Slate Bank of Brooten v. American Nat'l Bank, 266 N.W.2d 496, 499-500 (Minn.
1978).
,3 12A OKLA. SrAT. § 3-303(b) (1971).
" Marine Midland Bank v. Graybar Elec. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 703, 363 N.E.2d 1139, 395
N.Y.S.2d 403 (1977); Wilson Supply Co. v. West Artesia Trans. Co., 505 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ.
App.), affl'd, 511 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1974).
"' 366 F. Supp. 497 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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the time of suit, the note still had not been paid. In its Conclusions of
Law, 36 the court found that the amount due on the tax liens had been
unaffected by acceptance of the note. This result is as required by sec-
tion 3-802(b) of the Code. It is clear that if the note is uncollectible,
the government stands in a position regarding its tax claim no dif-
ferently than if the note had never been accepted. The payment is no
less "provisional" under section 3-802(b) for the government than it is
under sections 4-201 and 4-212 for the bank that exercises setoff
against provisional credits.
It has been held in Bowling Green, Inc. v. State Street Bank &
Trust Co. that a depository bank took a check for value where the
depositor had an existing overdraft in the account in which the check
was deposited. 3 7 Arguably, such a case is analogous to the situation
where the provisional credit is partially withdrawn, thereby con-
stituting value given by the bank under section 4-209.' 3s Yet the federal
district court held the overdraft to be an antecedent debt. There seems
to be no real difference between this case and the case in which the
bank applies a provisional credit to a separate debt of the depositor.
Actually, the automatic cancellation of the overdraft out of the
deposit is nothing more than setoff.
Furthermore, Massachusetts had held that where a depository
bank grants its depositor a provisional credit for a check drawn by a
third party and then in good faith permits its depositor to withdraw
funds against this provisional credit in liquidation of depositor's note
with the bank, the bank has given value for and has a security interest
in the check so as to allow recovery against the drawer thereon. 39
Again, there is no material difference between this case and the situa-
tion in which the bank, instead of accepting depositor's check against
the provisional credit, merely applies the credit against the note via
setoff.'4" After all, the right to setoff is nothing more than an
equitable rule recognizing the right of a bank to do unilaterally for the
debtor what the debtor should do himself.
In essence, the root considerations of the issue are these: The
maker or drawer of the instrument has a claim against the payee, most
likely arising out of the transactions for which the instrument was
2,6 Id. at 503.
'" Bowling Green, Inc. v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 307 F. Supp. 648 (D. Mass.
1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1970). Accord, Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. City National
Bank, 33 Conn. Supp. 641, 365 A.2d 1222 (Super. Ct. 1976).
" E.g., 12A OKLA. STAT. § 4-209 (1971).
" Waltham Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Flett, 353 Mass. 696, 234 N.E.2d 739 (1968).
240 McKee v. Hood, 312 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1963).
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issued. The bank has a claim against the payee for some unrelated
antecedent debt. Both likely dealt at arm's-length with the payee. The
issue becomes which party should be' favored under the law. If the
payee had not deposited the check but rather had transferred it to his
grocer in payment of last month's food bill, clearly the grocer would
prevail Over the drawer of the check, assuming the grocer otherwise
qualifies as a holder in due course. If the payee instead deposits the
check, and his bank applies it to his antecedent debt, should the result
be any different? Both the grocer and the bank stand in the same posi-
tion in regard to the prior debts if the check is not paid. Finally, the
controlling consideration should be the importance that has been
placed on negotiability' 4 ' since the advent of the Law Merchant, and
such preference should be maintained. It is hoped that when the issue
arises, Oklahoma courts will favor the bank instead of the drawer who
puts the negotiable instrument into the stream of commerce.
Of course, the bank in any event should remain aware of the
"shelter provision" set forth in section 3-102(a) of the UCC.'"2 This
provision vests in the bank the rights possessed by its transferor or any
prior transferor of the instrument. Therefore, in most cases, if some
prior holder of the instrument had holder in due course status, then
the bank can claim the same rights'43 and need not establish such
status in its own right.
Setoff Versus Presentment of Instrument
The outcome of a contest between a bank that has set off an ac-
count and a holder of a check drawn on the account is determined
under section 4-303 1 4 of the UCC. This section provides that setoff
comes too late to defeat the right of a holder of an item to payment
upon presentment if setoff is exercised after payment' 45 becomes final
or after the item has passed a "milestone"' ' 46 in the posting process.
The acts, or "milestones," which, once completed or passed, will
give the item priority over setoff, are acceptance or certification of the
item; payment in cash; settlement without the right to revoke; comple-
"I 'Wilson Supply Co. v. West Artesia Trans. Co., 505 S.W.2d 312, 316 (rex. Civ.
App.), aff'd, 511 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1974) (J. Klingeman, dissenting).
,41E.g., 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-201(a) (1971).
"I' Examples of situations in which the bank is not "sheltered" are when the bank has
been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, or as a prior holder of the instru-
ment had notice of a defense or claim against it. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 3-201(1) (1971).
E44 .g., 12A OKLA. STAT. § 4-303 (1971).
141 See text accompanying notes 118-120, supra, concerning the actions necessary for an
effective exercise of setoff.
"6 .g., 12A OKLA. STAT. § 4-303(1) (1971).
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tion of the process of posting, including "sight posting";', 7 or the
bank's becoming accountable for the item by failure to return or to
revoke settlement within the required time period.'4 " It is clear that
mere presentment and entry of a provisional credit in the presentor's
or collecting bank's account will not defeat a subsequent exercise of
setoff.1' 9
The presentment of a large check drawn on a depositor's account
may often be the final act that precipitates the bank's decision to set
off the account against a delinquent debt. Section 4-301 'Io gives the
bank the right to revoke any provisional credit or charge-back against
any credit given to the presentor's account ' in such a situation. This
greatly facilitates the ability to set off as these provisional credits will
often be given before the bank has any chance to act against the ac-
count upon which the item is drawn. '52 Of course, such revocation or
charge-back is possible only if final payment has not occurred and the
bank returns the item or sends written notice of dishonor before its
midnight deadline.'"
Setoff Versus Garnishor or Other Lien Creditors
When a creditor serves a bank with notice of garnishment of a
debtor's bank account, the general rule is that the bank may set off
the account against the debtor's matured debts owed to the bank.'
4
147 UCC § 4-303, Comment 3. There must be a decision to pay the item made by the
bank. Preliminary acts such as receipt of the item for deposit, entry of provisional credit, mak-
ing a provisional settlement, entry of credit in depositor's account or remittance are not suffi-
cient evidence of the bank's decision to pay and will not defeat setoff.
141 12A OKLA. STAT. §§ 4-213(1)(d), 4-302 (1971).
" Conn v. Bank of Clarendon Hills, 53 Ill. 2d 33, 289 N.E.2d 425 (1972); First Nat'l
Bank v. Keller, 193 Kan. 581, 396 P.2d 304 (1964); Pracht v. Oklahoma State Bank, 592 P.2d
976 (Okla. 1979).
110 12A OKLA. STAT. § 4-301 (1971).
' See also 12A OKLA. STAT. § 4-212(3) (1971).
"' Pracht v. Oklahoma State Bank, 592 P.2d 976 (Okla. 1979).
", 12A OKLA. STAT. § 4-301 (1971); Pracht v. Oklahoma State Bank, 592 P.2d 976 (Okla.
1979). In regard to completion of posting as constituting final payment, UCC § 4-109(e), which
provides for correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action made during the posting pro-
cess, could be interpreted to permit reversal of an entry after posting has been completed which
would then permit setoff against the recovered credit. See West Side Bank v. Marine Nat'l Ex-
change Bank, 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968). The section was probably not intended to
go this far but was more likely intended for situations where a bank computer automatically
debits an account for a check the bank did not intend to pay. The section would permit reversal
of the erroneous entry on the next computer run. North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. South Carolina
Nat'l Bank, 449 F. Supp. 616 (D.S.C.), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1305 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 985 (1978); H. Schultz & Sons, Inc. v. Bank of Suffolk County, 439 F. Supp. 1137
(E.D.N.Y. 1977); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 535-36 (1972).
Oklahoma did not adopt section 4-109.
"' This is clearly the rule in Oklahoma. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lundquist, 172
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The reason is that the attaching creditor stands in the shoes of the deb-
tor and has no greater rights to the deposit as against the bank than
the debtor.'5 5 Therefore, upon service of garnishment, the bank is en-
titled to set off the account if setoff would have been available against
the debtor at the time.' 5 6 In such situations, setoff is still subject to the
requirements and limitations discussed earlier, such as mutuality and
maturity.'
57
The bank's right to setoff need not be exercised immediately
upon the debt's maturity. Instead, the bank may wait until the account
is threatened by garnishment or attachment execution before exercis-
ing its right. The fact that the bookkeeping act evidencing completion
of setoff may not occur until after service of the garnishment process
or attachment execution will not defeat the bank's claim as long as
the right to setoff matured prior to the garnishment or attachment." 8
The bank must, however, actually apply the account against the indebt-
edness. The bank may not defeat the garnishor's claim by asserting
setoff, then permit the debtor or his other creditors to reach the funds
in preference over the garnishing creditor."' 9
Setoff Versus Federal Tax Levy
Public Policy Consideration
The right of setoff does not fare so well against a federal tax
levy. '6 While the cases are at best confusing, it is safe to assume that
as a general rule a bank may not exercise setoff after notice of a tax
levy.'6' The rule itself is not unreasonable considering the public policy
favoring collection of taxes when due. However, the reasoning of the
courts in formulating the rule conflicts with virtually every concept
and principle underlying the right of setoff discussed herein.
For example, in United States v. Sterling National Bank & Trust
Co.,' 2 the issue was what part of the debtor's deposit was properly
Okla. 453, 45 P.2d 524 (1935). In fact, the rule is all but universal. Annot., 106 A.L.R. 62
(1937); 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 130 (1943).
'" Waiters v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 59 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1936). See
also Plante v. M. Shortell & Son, Inc., 92 N.H. 38, 24 A.2d 498 (1942).
a6 W lters v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 59 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1936).
'" See 38 C.J.S. Garnishment § 130 (1943).
"' General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Tarr, 457 F. Supp. 935 (W. D. Pa. 1978).
," First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lundquist, 172 Okla. 453, 45 P.2d 524 (1935).
260 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6323 (1976).
26 United States Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); United States v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 494 F.2d 919 (2d
Cir. 1974).
1" 494 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1974).
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subject to the government's levy order under section 6332163 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code. The government argued that the entire account
at the time of levy should have been surrendered by the bank, while
the bank argued that only the balance after setoff was subject to the
levy. The court held that "under any realistic definition of 'property'
the full amount in [the debtor's] account was his property or his right
to property."' 164 The court recognized that the right to setoff existed at
the time of levy but reasoned that until the bank actually exercised
setoff, the debtor had full freedom to use the funds. The court il-
lustrated its point by noting that at any time prior to the levy, the deb-
tor could have written a check payable to the IRS for the balance of
the account; therefore the IRS was asserting no greater claim to the
funds at the time of levy than the debtor himself had.
This reasoning is faulty. First, the case itself recognizes that state
law determines the extent to which a debtor has property or rights to
property on which a tax lien could attach. As explained earlier, it is
uniformly held that when funds are deposited in a bank in a general
account, title to the funds passes to the bank. The depositor becomes a
creditor of the bank whose property interest becomes a chose in ac-
tion. 65 That is precisely what the government gets when it levies on the
bank. The value of the chose in action is determined by the extent to
which the debtor could enforce the claim. If, for example, he could
recover nothing in a suit on the account because of existing mature in-
debtedness owing to the bank, it would seem that his property interest
was valueless. Since the government cannot stand in a position better
than that of the debtor whose property is being levied upon,'6 6 it
would follow that the IRS could recover only the balance of the ac-
count after the bank exercised any proper setoff.
At any rate, the court was mistaken concerning the debtor's full
freedom to use the funds prior to setoff. As shown earlier, after
presentment of a check but before final payment, the bank may exer-
cise setoff against a previously matured debt and dishonor the check
even though presentment preceded actual exercise of setoff. 67 If the
debtor had paid the IRS by check, the bank could have dishonored the
263 26 U.S.C. § 6332 (1976).
"' United States v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 494 F.2d 919, 922 (2d Cir. 1974).
263 See text accompanying note 5 supra.
'" United States v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 494 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1974).
27 See Conn v. Bank of Clarendon Hill, 53 Ill. 2d 33, 289 N.E.2d 425 (1972); First Nat'l




OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
check and set off the account. Other recent cases are also unconvinc-
ing. 168
One rationale that was used in the earlier case of Bank of Nevada
v. United States'6' reasonably supports the priority of tax levy over
setoff. Recent cases cite this case frequently but seem to ignore the
basis of the decision. The early rationale was that under section
6322,170 the lien imposed by the IRS arises at the time of assessment of
the taxpayer. Since the bank claiming only setoff is not one of the per-
sons entitled to protection of the filing requirement of section 6323,' 7
the lien is effective against the bank as soon as notice of assessment is
made to the taxpayer, which may be long before the lien is filed or
notice of levy is served on the bank. The court, in Bank of Nevada,
went on to hold that the bank could not claim setoff where the debt to
which the account was to be applied arose after the lien. Since this ra-
tionale would permit setoff after notice of levy had been served on the
bank as long as the debt had matured before the lien arose, it is there-
fore somewhat inconsistent with the recent decisions. The recent deci-
sions clearly imply that had the bank exercised setoff prior to levy, the
IRS could not expect to prevail, regardless of whether the lien arose
before the debt matured.
One exception to the general rule occurs in the case in which
funds in the account arose from the same transaction as the debt the
bank seeks to set off and where the debtor is currently insolvent.' 2 In
such a case, setoff will apparently be permitted after levy. While this
exception is recognized even under the more recent cases, " 3 no at-
tempt is made to justify the exception in light of the courts' rationale
in denying setoff in other situations, presumably since no reasonably
consistent justification exists.
There is a definite need for the federal courts to reconsider their
past reasoning and establish a rule based upon a rationale that is con-
sistent with the general body of law concerning setoff. The court
"I E.g., United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied 4.30 U.S. 945 (1977); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 388 (D. Ariz.
1970) (mem.),. See also Olsen, The Appropriation of Deposits for Debts: Levies, Liens, and
Setoffs, 90 BANK. L.J. 827 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Olsen].
:69 Bank of Nevada v. United States, 251 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
938 (1958). See also Nevada Rock & Sand Co. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 161 (D. Nev.
1974); United States v. Salerno, 222 F. Supp. 664 (D. Nev. 1963), mod., 343 F.2d 71 (9th Cir.
1965).
"0 26 U.S.C. § 6322 (1976).
"' Id. § 6323.
271 United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); Olsen, supra note 168, at 839-40.
1" Id.
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should not try to decide the issue by analogy to rules governing liens,
security interests, and priority, as setoff is a substantially unique con-
cept worthy of separate analysis.
Economic Considerations
The courts should consider the economic relationship between the
parties in the commercial environment in which setoff operates. When
a note becomes due, a bank may often postpone the collection pro-
cesses if it still has faith in the debtor. The existence of substantial
funds in the debtor's account may be a primary factor in the bank's
decision to postpone collection. By careful monitoring of the ac-
counts, the amount at risk by the bank is effectively reduced by the
amount of the accounts. Each time an item is drawn on the account,
the bank, by honoring the item, in effect extends new credit to the
debtor, though enforceable through the prior loan agreement. This
would seem preferable to immediate foreclosure and setoff against the
first note, which would force the debtor to seek new credit to continue
operations. Postponing setoff and monitoring the account serves as
a kind of automatic refinancing without the additional paperwork. As
each item is presented against the account, the bank can decide
whether it wishes to extend the additional credit. A rule that prohibits
setoff after notice of an assessment forces the bank to extend new
credit to the debtor to the extent of the current account or loan
balance, whichever is less. Many would argue that it is unfair for the
government to force a bank to loan funds to a debtor so that he can
pay his taxes.
The current rule creates an obvious inconsistency within the tax
law itself. Section 6332(a)'74 of the Internal Revenue Code gives the
bank but two defenses for failure to comply with the tax levy: 1) that
the bank is not in possession of the taxpayer's property, or 2) that the
property is subject to prior judicial attachment or execution.' As
discussed earlier, 76 following service of garnishment, attachment, or
execution, the bank may first set off any proper claims against the ac-
counts before complying with the process. Following service of a tax
levy, the bank may not set off. Yet the judicial process defeats the tax
levy. So who prevails if a judicial process is served first, then a tax
levy, followed finally by an attempted bank setoff?
'" 26 U.S.C. § 6332(a) (1976).
' United States v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 494 F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1974);
Bank of Nevada v. United States, 251 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938
(1958); United States v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 198 F.2d 366, 369 (2d Cir. 1952).
176 See text accompanying note 146 supra.
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In the final analysis, sound argument may overcome bad prece-
dent, but until then, setoffs are likely to come in second to tax levies.
This result would be easier to understand if the courts would base it on
the rationale that most likely explains it, that being the " 'stubborn
principle' that virtually nothing should 'frustrate the sovereign from
collecting its taxes.' 22177
Setoff Versus Trustee in Bankruptcy
Prior Law
Under the old Bankruptcy Act, 78 which is still applicable to those
cases filed prior to October 1, 1979, a banker's right to setoff was
recognized under section 68(a).' 79 Subject to the general prerequisites
for setoff, a bank could set off the deposits of a bankrupt existing at
the time the petition in bankruptcy is filed, notwithstanding the fact
that the deposits were made within four months of the filing and that
the bank had knowledge of the depositor's insolvency. 8 Setoff could
be executed after the petition is filed, but only funds deposited prior to
the filing were subject to setoff.' 8' The deposits were required to be
made and accepted in good faith, in the normal course of business,
and not for the purpose of permitting a setoff.'82 For example, if it ap-
peared that the depositor was intentionally building up his deposits to
permit the bank to exercise setoff, a voidable preference could be
found.'83
Bankruptcy Reform Act
The right of setoff in bankruptcy was substantially revised under
the new Bankruptcy Reform Act, 8 " which applies to all cases filed on
' Olsen, supra note 168, at 832 n.16, citing Bank of Nevada v. United States, 251 F.2d
820r, 828 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
171 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 etseq. (1976).
179 11 U.S.C. § 108a (1976).
10 Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 253 (1912); Leibowitz, Bank's Right to
Setoff in Bankruptcy: "From Erosion to Extinction, " 94 BANK L.J. 796, 797 (1977).
"I In re Montgomery Bros., 51 F.2d 284 (S.D. Miss. 1931); Cobb v. United States, 81 F.
Supp. 9 (W.D. La. 1948); In re Merchandise Mart, 79 F. Supp. 686 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
"I Katz v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069
(1978); McKee v. Hood, 312 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1963); Florida Trailer & Equip. Co. v. Deal, 284
F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1960); Joseph F. Hughes & Co. v. Machen, 164 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 881 (1948); Goldstein v. Franklin Square Nat'l Bank, 107 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.
1939); Stevens v. Bank of Manhattan Trust Co., 66 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1933). See also In re Ap-
plied Logic Corp., 576 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1978).
" 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976); Katz v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Joseph F. Hughes & Co. v. Machen, 164 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 881 (1948); Goldstein v. Franklin Square Nat'l Bank, 107 F.2d 393 (2d
Cir. 1939); Matters v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 54 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1932).
114 Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter cited
as New Act].
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or after October 1, 1979. While retaining all prior limitations on
setoff, the new Act adds two new restrictions. The first is applicable to
pre-bankruptcy setoffs and is called the "improvement in position
test."'II It is intended to prevent the bank from obtaining a preference
by an improvement in the bank's position during the ninety days pre-
ceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 1" 6 The second restriction
is the automatic stay applicable to post-bankruptcy setoffs." '
Pre-Bankruptcy Setoff. In the case of a pre-bankruptcy setoff,
section 553(b) of the Act permits the trustee to recover from the bank
to the extent that any insufficiency on the date of such setoff is
less than the insufficiency on the later of-
(A) 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(B) the first date during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of
the filing of the petition on which there is an insufficiency.' 8
An insufficiency is defined as the amount, if any, by which the bank's
claim against the debtor exceeds the deposits available for setoff.'9 As
we shall see, the words "if any" cause some difficulty.
Legislative history indicates that the two-point test for determina-
tion of the controlling dates was to provide for situations (1) where the
debt to be set off arose before the 90-day period, in which case the
balance on the ninetieth day would be utilized, and (2) where the debt
first arose during the 90-day period, in which case the balance on the
date when setoff first became possible would be utilized.'90
The rule is applicable only to pre-bankruptcy offsets and is in-
tended to prevent the bank from obtaining a preference, thereby im-
proving its position through increased deposits or loan repayments
made within ninety days of bankruptcy, regardless of whether the
deposits or payments were made in the ordinary course of business.' 9'
In effect, the rule limits the bank's recovery to the lesser of the
amount on deposit on the date of setoff and the amount on deposit
ninety days prior to the date of the filing of the petition.
"' New Act, supra note 184, § 553(b). See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 91
(1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5877-78. Cf. New Act § 547(c)(5)
(similar test).
"6 Justman, Comments on the Bank's Right to Setoff under the Proposed Bankruptcy
Act of 1973, 31 Bus. LAW. 1607, 1611 (1976) [hereinafater cited as Justman].
'" New Act, supra note 184, § 362(a)(7).
Id. § 553(b)(1).
Id. § 533(b)(2).
" S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 91-92, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5787, 5877-78; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 184-85, reprinted in
[1978] U.S. CODE & An. NEWS 5963, 6145-46; H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5-201(b)
(1973).
"' Justman, supra note 186, at 1611.
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For example, assume that for all periods herein discussed, the
bank had a $10,000 claim against the debtor. Ninety days prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, the debtor had funds totaling $4,000
with the bank and available for setoff. The insufficiency at that time
was $6,000 (i.e., $10,000 - $4,000 = $6,000). Further assume that 20
days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition the bank exercised its
right of setoff and at that time the amount in the debtor's account had
been increased to $8,500. The result would be an insufficiency of
$1,500 (i.e.. $10,000 - $8,500 = $1,500), or a corresponding $4,500
improvement in the bank's position. It is the difference in the insuffi-
ciencies, or $4,500 (i.e., $6,000 - $1,500 = $4,500), which can be
recovered by the trustee.
As another example, assume that for all periods herein discussed
the debtor had funds totaling $6,000 on deposit in the bank and
available for setoff. If the debtor owed the bank $11,000 ninety days
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the insufficiency at that
time would be $5,000 (i.e., $11,000 - $6,000 = $5,000). Further
assume that 15 days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the
debtor repaid $3,000 of the amount owed so that there remained an
$8,000 debt still owed to the bank. If at this time the bank exercised its
right of setoff, the resulting insufficiency would be $2,000 (i.e., $8,000
- $6,000 = $2,000), or a corresponding improvement in the bank's
position of $3,000 (i.e., $5,000 - $2,000 = $3,000). It is this amount
that the trustee is entitled to recover.
Literally, the rule could be read to require that if there is no
positive insufficiency on the ninetieth day prior to the petition, even
though the debt has matured and setoff is available on that date, then
a later date when a positive deficiency exists between the bank's claim
and the debtor's account would serve as the determinative date.
Under this interpretation, if there was no insufficiency ninety
days prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, then the "improve-
ment in position" that may be recovered by the trustee is measured by
determining the amount of the first insufficiency to occur during the
90-day period and subtracting that amount from the insufficiency on
the subsequent date of setoff during the 90-day period. For example, if
the balance of the debtor's account was $12,000 ninety days prior to
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and the amount the debtor owed
the bank was $10,000, there would be no insufficiency. If, however,
eighty-seven days before the bankruptcy petition was filed the debtor
withdrew $5,000 from the account, there would then be $7,000 on
deposit (i.e., $12,000 - $5,000 = $7,000), and a resulting $3,000 (i.e.,
$10,000 - $7,000 = $3,000) insufficiency. If the balance in the ac-
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count remained constant at $7,000, but ten days before the filing of
the bankruptcy petition the debtor repaid $1,000 of the $10,000 owed,
that would leave $9,000 debt to the bank. If at that time the bank exer-
cised its right of setoff, there would have been a $2,000 (i.e., $9,000 -
$7,000 = $2,000) insufficiency and a corresponding improvement in
the bank's position of $1,000 (i.e., $3,000 - $2,000 = $1,000). It is
this amount the trustee is entitled to recover.
Thus, the improvement in position can be interpreted to be a two-
point positive insufficiency test. The first point is the insufficiency ex-
isting ninety days prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition if there
is a positive insufficiency existing on that date and, if not, the first day
a positive insufficiency occurs during the 90-day period. The second
point is the insufficiency existing at the time of the exercise of the right
of setoff during the 90-day period. Such an interpretation produces an
arbitrary and possibly unfair result that may be contrary to the in-
tended purpose of the drafters.
Nevertheless, this is the interpretation placed on this language by
at least some renowned authorities.' 92 However, because of the words
"if any" contained in the statutory definition of "insufficiency," it
could be interpreted to mean that an insufficiency existed on the
ninetieth day before the bankruptcy petition was filed or on the first
date during the 90-day period on which the debt had matured and set-
off was available, even if the amount of the insufficiency on the
ninetieth day was zero.1 91
Also, the "in ordinary course of business" test for deposits made
during the 90-day period is retained in the new Act. For example,
assume that the debt to the bank was a $10,000 demand note. Ninety
days prior to the filing of the petition the account balance is $4,000,
and thus the limit the bank may ultimately recover through setoff is
$4,000. During the 90-day period, however, the balance may fall to
zero and then increase back to $4,000 or more at the time of bankrupt-
cy. Clearly, $4,000 of the deposits made during the 90-day period will
be available for setoff unless they were not made in the ordinary
course of business but rather for the purpose of permitting the bank to
recover a larger amount through setoff. 94
112 Trost, Treister, Forman et al., "The New Federal Bankruptcy Code," ALI-ABA In-
stitute, conducted in New York City, Dec. 14-16, 1978.
The definition of "insufficiency" in the New Act, supra note 184, § 533(b)(2) supports
such a construction, stating that "'insufficiency' means amount, if any, by which a claim
against the debtor exceeds a mutual debt owing to the debtor by the holder of such claim" (em-
phasis added).




Post-Bankruptcy Setoff. The "improvement in position," with
its attendant calculations of insufficiencies, is not applicable to post-
bankruptcy setoffs. This result should discourage bankers from trig-
gering a debtor's bankruptcy by exercising the right of setoff when the
debtor's situation might otherwise be salvageable outside of bankrupt-
cy. However, a post-bankruptcy setoff is subject to the automatic stay
provisions of section 362 of the Act,"g5 which are not applicable to pre-
bankruptcy setoffs.
Thus, a right to setoff, which the bank was free to exercise prior
to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, cannot be exercised by the bank
after the filing of the petition and the pendency of the case unless the
stay is lifted. This requires that the bank file a petition requesting that
the automTatic stay be lifted. Within thirty days after receiving such a
request the court must conduct a hearing that will result in either grant-
ing the request or providing the bank with adequate protection." 6
Because the debtor's deposit account is classified as "cash collater-
al,"' 97 the court may not permit the trustee to have access to the ac-
count, even for expenditures to be made in the ordinary course of an
ongoing business, without providing the bank with adequate protec-
tion. 198
It will be interesting to see if the burden of the improvement in
position test imposed on a pre-bankruptcy setoff and the adequate
protection the bank enjoys in a post-bankruptcy setoff will cause
bankers to defer exercising their right of setoff when the debtor's
bankruptcy appears imminent.
Setoff Versus Secured Creditor's Proceeds"'
The JCC does not apply to the creation of an original security in-
terest in deposit accounts.200 However, a security interest in a deposit
account where proceeds from the sale of collateral are deposited in the
account is subject to the UCC. 20 1 It is well accepted that any potential
problem of identifying such funds in a commingled account may be
Id. § 362(a)(7).
Id. § 362(e).
'" Id. § 363(a).
"' Id. §§ 363(c)(2) and (e).
, For an excellent discussion of this general area, the underlying commercial policies
concerned, and an enlightened proposal for change, see Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in a
Debtor's Bank Account Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1977 So. ILL. L.J.
120 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Skilton].
200 E.g., 12A OKLA. STAT. § 9-104(i) (1971).
201 E.g., 12A OKLA. STAT. § 9-306 (1971).
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solved by permitting state law tracing rules to determine the extent of
the security interest in the account. 02
There is a predictable split in authority as to how courts are
reconciling the secured creditors' proceeds interest in the debtor's ac-
count and the bank's right to set off the same account. It does seem
clear that section 9-306(4)(d)(i) of the UCC, which subjects the secured
creditor's interest in a commingled account in bankruptcy proceedings
to "any right of set-off," does not create any new right of setoff but
involves any right of setoff otherwise available under state law.20 3
Hence, there is a natural split between states that follow the majority
rule20 4 concerning the right of banks to set off funds in which third
persons have an interest, and those that follow the equitable rule. 20 5 A
third line of cases has also developed wherein courts have found it un-
necessary to resort to prior state law concerning setoff, holding instead
that UCC Article 9 priority provisions are sufficient and have super-
seded any prior rule where a security interest is involved.20 6
Under the majority rule a bank may set off the general deposit of
a debtor, even though a third party has an interest in the funds, if the
bank has no knowledge of the third party's interest nor knowledge of
sufficient facts to put the bank on inquiry notice as to such facts.
20 7
Under this rule, a bank can set off the account even though the
secured creditor has a perfected continuing security interest in the ac-
count. 20 8 In many situations, the court may easily find that cir-
202 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fiist Nat'l Bank, 504 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1974);
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Rodi Boat
Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 236 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 339 F.2d
259 (3d Cir. 1964); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Homes Sales, Inc., 26 N.C. App.
690, 217 S.E.2d 108 (1975); Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. First Am. Bank, 614 P.2d 1091 (Okla.
1980). See also Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. App. 1978).
20 Rodi Boat Co. v. Provident Tradesmen Bank & Trust Co., 236 F. Supp. 935 (E.D.
Pa.), affrd, 339 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1964); Morrison Steel Co. v. Gurtman, 113 N.J. Super. 474,
274 A.2d 306 (1971); Middle Atlantic Credit Corp. v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 199 Pa.
Super. 456, 185 A.2d 818 (1962); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee Western Bank, 61
Wis. 2d 671, 214 N.W.2d 33 (1974).
204 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
205 See text accompanying notes 25-47 supra.
20 Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. App. 1978);
Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 111 N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d 330
(1970). See also National Acceptance Co. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 491 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va.
1980); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Mor-
ris Plan Co. v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 598 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. App. 1980); Morrison Steel Co. v.
Gurtman, 113 N.J. Super. 474, 274 A.2d 306 (1971), which recognize that the UCC may have
superseded prior law.
20, See text accompanying note 24 supra.
205 Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973);
Morrison Steel Co. v. Gurtman, 113 N.J. Super. 474, 274 A.2d 306 (1971). But see Cooper v.
Nevada Bank of Commerce, 81 Nev. 344, 403 P.2d 198 (1965).
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cumstances are such that the bank had knowledge of facts sufficient to
put it on inquiry notice. 09
Under the equitable rule, a bank may not set off funds in which a
third party has an interest, regardless of the bank's lack of knowledge,
unless the bank has changed its position to its detriment or has ac-
quired superior equities in reliance on the depositor's apparent sole
ownership.2 10 Under this rule, the security interest will prevail, even if
unperfected,211 unless the bank has changed its position to its detri-
ment, such as by the release of collateral or the extension of credit in
reliance on the deposits."' There would seem to be one good argument
for subordinating the secured creditor's claim where the security in-
terest is unperfected, that being to prevent a circuitous result in the
following situation. If an intervening creditor garnished the account,
section 9-301(a)(b) of the UCC would subordinate the unperfected
security interest to the garnishor's claim. As discussed earlier, service
of notice of garnishment will not prevent setoff where otherwise ap-
propriate; thus the bank would prevail over the garnishor.2 1 Yet,
under the strict equitable rule, the security interest would prevail over
the right of setoff.
The recent trend among the courts considering the issue of prior-
ity between a proceeds security interest and bank setoff has been to
discard prior law and treat the issue as one solely within the scope of
Article 9."1 In the most recent case to consider the issue, the Indiana
Court of Appeals handed down the most extensive consideration of
the issue to date in holding that Article 9 controlled. 213 The reasoning
of the court is somewhat misguided and future courts should do con-
siderable independent analysis before endorsing the reasoning of the
Indiana decision.
In that case, styled Citizens National Bank v. Mid-States Develop-
ment Co.,216 the Indiana court held that UCC section 9-201 gave the
209 Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
But see Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1974).
210 See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
"' Rodi Boat Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 236 F. Supp. 935 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 339 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1964).
'" Id.; Middle Atlantic Credit Corp. v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 199 Pa. Super.
456, 185 A.2d 818 (1962); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee Western Bank, 61 Wis. 2d
671, 214 N.W.2d 33 (1974).
2,3 See text accompanying notes 146-149 supra.
214 Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. App. 1978);
Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 111 N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d 330
(1970). Contra, First Nat'l Bank v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 529 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. 1975). See also
Morris Plan Co. v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 598 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. App. 1980).
.1. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. App. 1978).
216 Id.
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secured creditor priority over "anyone, anywhere, anyhow" except as
otherwise provided by Code priority rules.217 The court then held that no
other provisions of the Code were applicable, therefore section 9-201
controlled and the security interest prevailed over setoff. Under this
rationale, the bank would always lose even though it changed its posi-
tion to its detriment without knowledge and in good faith, through
reliance upon setoff to collect its debt. Hence, the rigid rule of the In-
diana court is unfair and unjustified even under Article 9 analysis
alone.
Section 9-20121B provides that the security interest is effective be-
tween the parties to the agreement and against purchasers of the col-
lateral or creditors, except as otherwise provided. It was an oversimpli-
fication for the court to hold that no other provision applied simply
because no provision discussed priority between the security interest
and setoff. On the contrary, several provisions would seem applicable
by analogy. Comment 2 to section 9-306 recognizes that where cash
proceeds are deposited into the debtor's checking account and paid
out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients of the funds in
the ordinary course of business take free of the security interest. Even
if the funds were not deposited in the ordinary course of business, the
secured party should prevail only if the transfer was fraudulent.219
Therefore, if the bank sets off in good faith, without notice and for
value, the law of money, good-faith purchasers, and holders in due
course would seem to offer more protection than the Indiana court
deemed appropriate, even where the transfer is not in the ordinary
course of business. This is probably one instance in which satisfaction
of an antecedent debt should not constitute value. When the bank
releases collateral to the debtor, extends new credit in reliance on the
deposit, or otherwise changes its position, some degree of protection is
in order.
Section 9-318(1)22 0 also lends support to the bank's claim. This
provision subjects the rights of an assignee of an account to any
defense or claim the account debtor may have against the assignor
before the account debtor receives notification of the assignment.
Arguably, this provision could apply to the situation in question-the
bank being an account debtor, the depositor being the assignor, and
the secured creditor being an assignee of an interest in the account.22'
"I Id. at 1248.
21 E.g., 12 OKLA. STAT. § 9-201 (1971).
239 Skilton, supra note 199, at 152.
220 E.g., 12A. OKLA. SrAT. § 9-318(1) (1971).
221 Skilton, supra note 199, at 204.
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Even when the bank knows of the security interest, it has been
held that the bank's only duty to the secured creditor "is not to release
the deposit to the depositor unreasonably soon after the claimant
makes known his adverse claim." 2 ' It is the secured party's duty
"promptly to institute necessary legal proceedings to stop payment to
depositor by court order or process; and if claimant does not do so the
bank is released from liability to the claimant." 2 3 Therefore, after
waiting a reasonable time, the bank may begin honoring checks drawn
by the debtor despite knowledge of the security interest. It is unfair to
require the bank to honor checks paying those creditors the debtor
chooses to pay and at the same time prevent the bank from collecting
its own debt from the depositor. The basic principle upon which the
banker's right to setoff was founded is that such a situation should not
be permitted.
Consequences of Wrongful Setoff
At first glance, it seems that when in doubt, a bank might be
well-advised to exercise setoff first and then contest the validity of the
setoff against claims of other parties. This would insure availability of
the funds on deposit if the bank prevails. Arguably, if the depositor or
another claimant prevails, the bank must merely turn over the funds
appropriated to the prevailing claimant, leaving the bank in no worse
position than if setoff had not been exercised.
This argument fails because the liability of the bank for wrongful
setoff may greatly exceed the amount of the deposit appropriated by
the bank. This increased liability exists because wrongful setoff will
often result in wrongful dishonor of the depositor's checks. Section
4-402 of the Code, which establishes the bank's liability for wrongful
dishonor, provides:
A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately caused
by the wrongful dishonor of an item. When the dishonor occurs
through mistake, liability is limited to actual damages proved. If so
proximately caused and proved, damages may include damages for an
arrest or prosecution of the customer or other consequential damages.
Whether any consequential damages are proximately caused by the
wrongful dishonor is a question of fact to be determined in each case. 24
22 Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee Western Bank, 61 Wis. 2d 671, 687, 214
N.W.2d 33, 41 (1974).
223 Id.
224 E.g., 12A OKLA. STAT. § 4-402 (1971).
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This section permits recovery for any actual or consequential injury
that is a proximate result of the dishonor, even if such dishonor occurs
by mistake.22 5 Depositors may be permitted to recover damages for
lost profits due to injury to business relationships, 2 6 for emotional
distress,227 for injury to credit and business reputation,228 for time lost
from employment, 229 and even for phone calls made in trying to
recover the funds.230
It is also clear that punitive damages may be awarded when the
setoff is wrongful and oppression, fraud, or actual malice or its legal
equivalent can be established.
23
Conclusion
While the bank's right to setoff provides the bank with an easy
and valuable remedy in a great many situations, it is not without its
risks and penalties if abused. Bankers should therefore exercise setoff
with great caution and only upon the advice of knowledgeable
counsel.
225 American Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 146 Ind. App. 122, 252 N.E.2d
839 (1969). See also Allison v. First Nat'l Bank, 85 N.M. 283, 511 P.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 85 N.M. 511, 514 P.2d 30 (1978). But see Bank of Louisville Royal v.
Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968); Harvey v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 19 U.C.C. Rep. 906 (Mich.
Ct. Comm. P1. 1974).
226 Skov. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 407 F.2d 1318 (3d Cir. 1969).
227 Kandall Yacht Corp. v. United Cal. Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848
(1975); First Nat'l Bank v. Hubbs, 566 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Northshore Bank v.
Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
22 Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United Cal. Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848
(1975); American Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 146 Ind. App. 122, 252 N.E.2d 839
(1969); Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966); Allison v. First
Nat'l Bank, 85 N.M. 283, 511 P.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 85 N.M. 511,
514 P.2d 30 (1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Hubbs, 566 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); North-
shore Bank v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
229 Northshore Bank v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
210 Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968).
22 Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972); Northshore Bank
v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718 (rex. Civ. App. 1975).
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